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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
INSURANCE
POLICEMEN HELD "EMPLOYEES" UNDER INSURANCE POLICY

Policeman Robinson was fatally injured in an auto collision while he was
riding as a passenger in a police car which was being driven by another policeman. The car was covered by an automobile liability policy which had been
issued to the City of Albany. The policy contained the following provision:
"This policy does not apply: ...
'(d) under coverage A, to bodily injury to or sickness, disease, or
death of any employee of the insured arisingout of and in the course
of (1) domestic employment by the insured, if benefits therefor are
in whole or in part either payable or required to be provided under
any workmen's compensation law, or (2) other employment by the
insured . .' "1
The City of Albany brought a declaratory judgment action to determine that
the insurance company should defend the City in an action against the City
for the wrongful death of Robinson. In City of Albany v. Standard Accident
Insurance Company,2 because of the above provision in the insurance policy,
coverage was denied the City of Albany for any liability incurred for the
wrongful death of policeman Robinson.
The City of Albany had two strong arguments. Its first argument was.
founded on the common-law rule that ". . . a policeman is not considered a
municipal agent or servant but a public officer performing a governmental
function." 3 Such common-law rule, the City argued, is fortified by section 50-a
of the General Municipal Law. 4 The Court first stated that the Court of Claims
Act, Section 8,5 is the controlling legislative enactment in regard to the status
of police officers and under such enactment a policeman may be a municipal
employee. The Court then stated, however, that the contest between Section
50-a of the General Municipal Law and Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act
was irrelevant. The Court's statement as to the superiority of Section 8 of the
Court of Claims Act became mere dictum. The true answer to the City's first
argument lies in the following words of the Court: ". . . Section 50-a does
1. City of Albany v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 7 N.Y2d 422, 426, 198
N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (1960).
2. Id.
3. Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 68, 186 N.E. 203, 205 (1933).
4. Every city . . .shall be liable for the negligence- of a person duly appointed
by the governing board . . . of the municipality . . . to operate a municipally

owned vehicle ...

in the discharge of a statutory duty imposed upon the munici-

pality.... Every such appointee shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed
an employee of the municipality notwithstanding the vehicle was being operated
in the discharge of a public duty for the benefit of all citizens of the community....
The city unsuccessfully argued that the statute made only the driver and not

passenger Robinson an employee.
S. The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied to actions in the Supreme Court against individuals or

corporations....
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not purport to affect or have any bearing on the definition of the word 'employee' as used in an insurance policy. We are concerned, in the instant case,
not with the liability of a municipality under a statute . . ., but with the
liability of an insurer under a contract of insurance."G The definition of the
word "employee" as used in the insurance contract is to be determined in
the same way that the definition of any word in any contract is determinedby looking to the intention of the parties as indicated by the language of the
contract and the surrounding circumstances. This rule of interpretation applies
in all cases where a statute does not provide a definition for the word "employee" to be used in insurance contracts. Since the statutory content was
irrelevant, the only question remaining was the intention of the parties as to
the meaning of the word "employee." The Court held that the ordinary meanning of the word would make a policeman of the City of Albany an "employee"
of that city.
The City's second argument was that the above quoted provision of
the policy excluded coverage only for liability to employees of an employer
who carried or was required to carry workmen's compensation insurance. The
City did not carry such insurance. Nor did the death of Robinson arise in the
course of "domestic employment." The following language by the Appellate
Division in a case involving a similar policy, Greaves v. Public Scrvice Mutial
Ins. Co.,7 was the foundation of the City's unsuccessful argument:
"As we read the exclusion clause, the basic and underlying purpose was
to exclude coverage only as to an assured who either carried or was required
to carry workmen's compensation insurance for the protection of an injured
employee." s
The above quoted language from the Greaves case, as this Court points
out, "was not necessary to the decision, and was not adopted or indorsed by
our Court's affirming opinion (at 5 N.Y.2d 120, 181 N.Y.S.2d 489)."'0 Thus
collapsed the City's second principal argument. The Court went on to reinforce what had already been decided in Jewtraw v. Hartford Acc. & Ind.
Co.,' namely, that clause (2) (d) of this policy, as above quoted, contains no
mention of workmen's compensation, that any consideration of workmen's
compensation must be limited to "domestic employment" as contained in
clause (1) (d), and that therefore, because "other employment" and not
"domestic employment" was involved in this case, the City was excluded from
coverage despite any consideration of workmen's compensation.
This case points up one significant fact: an insurance policy is a contract.
As such, the principles of contract law will generally apply in the interpretation
of a policy. It should be noted, however, that contract law many times does
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Supra note 1 at 430, 198 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1960).
4 A.D.2d 609, 168 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1st Dep't 1957).
Id. at 612, 168 N.Y.S.2d 109.
Supra note 1 at 432, 198 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1960).
280 App. Div. 150, 112 N.Y.S.2d 727 (3d Dep't 1952).
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not determine the meaning of a word or phrase in an insurance policy. Insurance law is largely statutory. More often than not, a case involving an insurance
policy will be determined not by reference to the principles of contract law
but by reference to applicable provisions of the New York insurance statutes.
The instant case is a reminder however that insurance law is not governed entirely by statute-that, when there is not an applicable provision of the
insurance statute that solves a given case, resort must be had to common-law
contract law because an insurance policy is fundamentally a contract. Such
resort was held in the instant case in order to determine the meaning of the
word "employee."

LABOR LAW
FEDERAL PREEMPTION op STATE JUISDICTION IN LABOR CASES
The New York courts have in the past applied the doctrine that in an
alleged labor dispute they will resolve all doubts about jurisdiction in favor
of state courts and against NLRB jurisdiction. The ostensible reason for this
policy was that if relief was denied by the state court, and it was later decided
that the state in fact had jurisdiction, then irreparable harm may have been
done to the plaintiff, or possibly a just grievance may have been foreclosed
from judicial or administrative- correction altogether. If the United States Supreme Court decided that in a particular case the state had over-stepped its
jurisdictional limits, it could set the case aright, and in the process illumine that
area of the law for future state guidance.
Without going into the merits of the above policy or its rationale, the
Court of Appeals dramatically and unequivocally reversed itself in Dooly v.
Anton.2 The facts of the Dooly case are relatively simple. Two minority unions
were engaged in peaceful picketing (found by the lower court to be recognitional) of plaintiff's meat purveying establishment at the same time that
plaintiff recognized and had a contract with an independent union which
represented a majority of the employees. The employer sought and obtained
an injunction in the Supreme Court, Special Term, permanently restraining
such picketing by the defendant minority unions, which injunction was affirmed
by the Appellate Division. a
The lower courts relied upon Pleasant Vally Packing Co. v. Talarico,3 a
case with a similar factual situation except that there the majority union
was certified by the National Labor Relations Board. The Court of Appeals
in the Pleasant Valley case held that such activity was neither an unfair labor
practice under Section 8 (B) (4) (C), nor protected under Section 7, of the
1.
2.
2a.
3.

Pleasant Valley Packing Co. v. Talarico, 5 N.Y2d 40, 177 N.YS.2d 473 (1958).
8 N.Y.2d 91, 202 N.YS.2d 273 (1960).
7 A.D.2d 880, 182 N.Y.S.2d 314 (4th Dep't 1959).
Supra note 1.

